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Abstract
Until now mean-field-type game theory was not focused on cognitively-
plausible models of choices in humans, animals, machines, robots, software-
defined and mobile devices strategic interactions. This work presents some
effects of users’ psychology in mean-field-type games. In addition to the
traditional “material” payoff modelling, psychological patterns are intro-
duced in order to better capture and understand behaviors that are ob-
served in engineering practice or in experimental settings. The psycho-
logical payoff value depends upon choices, mean-field states, mean-field
actions, empathy and beliefs. It is shown that the affective empathy
enforces mean-field equilibrium payoff equity and improves fairness be-
tween the players. It establishes equilibrium systems for such interac-
tive decision-making problems. Basic empathy concepts are illustrated
in several important problems in engineering including resource sharing,
packet collision minimization, energy markets, and forwarding in Device-
to-Device communications. The work conducts also an experiment with
47 people who have to decide whether to cooperate or not. The basic In-
terpersonal Reactivity Index of empathy metrics were used to measure the
empathy distribution of each participant. Android app called Empathizer
is developed to analyze systematically the data obtained from the par-
ticipants. The experimental results reveal that the dominated strategies
of the classical game theory are not dominated any more when users’
psychology is involved, and a significant level of cooperation is observed
among the users who are positively partially empathetic.
Keywords: Psychology, empathy, game theory, mean-field, belief, consis-
tency
∗Part of this work appeared in [2].
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1 Introduction
Until now, mean-field-type game theory was not focused on cognitively-plausible
models of choices in humans, animals, machines, robots, software-defined and
mobile devices strategic interactions. This paper studies behavioral and psycho-
logical games of mean-field type. Psychological games seems to explain behav-
iors that are better captured in experiments or in practice than classical game-
theoretic equilibrium analysis. It takes in consideration psychological patterns
of the decision-makers in addition to the traditional “material” payoff mod-
elling. The payoff value depends upon choice consequences, mean-field states,
mean-field actions and on beliefs about what will happen. The psychological
game theory framework can link cognition, emotion, and express emotions, guilt,
empathy, altruism, spitefulness (maliciousness) of the decision-makers. It also
include belief-dependent and other-regarding preferences in the motivations.
One motivating example of psychological game theory is trying to understand
how her users and consumers will perceive a product or are thinking about a
product in web online shop and will engage in empathy in the interaction. There
are several definitions of empathy in the literature (see [4]). Cognitive empathy
of a player, sometimes also called perspective taking, is the ability to identify
the felling and emotions of other players. Perspective taking empathy is con-
sidered as the experience of understanding another player’s state and actions
from their perspective or mutual perspective via several channels. A decision-
maker can place herself in the shoes of the others and feel what they are feeling.
This is a particularly useful concept in the context of psychological game the-
ory. Indeed, it helps to anticipate, compute and to react to the behavior of
the others thanks to empathy. Note that, empathy is different than sympathy
which is the ability to select appropriate emotional responses for the apparent
emotional states of others. In other words, sympathy is not about feeling the
same thing that somebody else is feeling, but an appropriate emotion to comple-
ment theirs. Another notion is compassion which heuristically is to treat others
as you would like to be treated. It consists in selecting the appropriate action
in response to the apparent emotional states of another. This active version
of empathy may result in partial altruism in the preferences formation of the
players. In game theory, the strategy and the resulting actions play key roles in
the outcomes. A player may use empathy in different ways. Examples include
empathy-selfishness, empathy-altruism and empathy-spitefulness. In this work,
we examine basic empathy subscales: perspective taking (PT), empathy con-
cern (EC), fantasy scale (FS) and personal distress (PD) that will be evaluated
through the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, [33]).
1.1 Overview
We overview some prior works on empathy in game theory. The motivation of
decision makers who care for various emotions, intentions-based reciprocity, or
the opinions of others may depend directly on beliefs (about choices, states, be-
haviors, or information). The study in [4] tries to explain how we can understand
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what someone else feels when he or she experiences simple emotions. Some psy-
chological factors are considered in a game theoretic context [5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 18].
The work in [25] investigates the neural basis of complex decision making using
a game theory. The authors of [26] study neuroeconomics approach to decision-
making by combining game theory with psychological and neuroscientific meth-
ods. The work in [19] underlined how empathy leads to fairness and [20] studied
the correlation between empathy, anticipated guilt and prosocial behaviour; in
his study he found out that empathy affects prosocial behaviour in a more com-
plex way than the one represented by the classical model of social choices. The
authors in [6] propose and synthesize a large body of experimental and theo-
retical analysis on multi-agent interactions, in psychology as well as economics.
The work in [27] presents a game theoretic approach to empathy, reporting
on current knowledge of the evolutionary, social, developmental, cognitive, and
neurobiological aspects of empathy and linking this capacity to human com-
munication, including in clinical practice and medical education. Under mild
conditions, [30] shows that such empathetic preferences requiring us to see things
from another’s point of view can be summarized by empathic payoff function.
The idea of empathic preferences was followed in [28] where the importance of
empathic payoff function is illustrated. The work in [32] presents an overview on
empathy and mind reading in some detail and have pointed out other-regarding
preferences in game theory. In the classical approach, they are taken to be, in
the ’worst’ case, a purely selfish or, in the best case, self- regarding individuals.
In the psychological payoffs, players may care about the betterment of others
as well as themselves but their position, state or consumption is simply another
argument of their own preferences. Other-regarding preferences are sometimes
presented not simply as being concerned with the payoff of specific others, but
may incorporate more general concerns, such as equity, risk and fairness. The
problem of comparing the payoff of different players is vital for the question
of fairness and equity [29]. The work in [21] proposes an evolutionary game-
theoretic approach to study the evolutionary effect of empathy on cooperative
games. The origin, the source and learnability of empathy remains open. The
evolution of empathy and its connection to reciprocal altruism are discussed in
[31]. Building on dynamic interactive epistemology, [10] proposes a more gen-
eral framework that includes higher-order beliefs, beliefs of others, and plans
of action may influence motivation, dynamic psychological patterns (such as
sequential reciprocity, psychological forward induction, and regret). These pre-
liminary studies enrich classical game theory by empirical knowledge and makes
it significantly closer to what is needed for real-world applications. Thousands
of theoretical papers have been published about the prisoner’s dilemma game
and more than 30 experiments about have been conducted in the literature,
only few of them are dedicated to the emergence of cooperative behaviors in
one-shot games [37]. The works in [38, 39, 40] consider decision-making prob-
lems. However, the effect of users’ psychology on its decision is not examined
in these previous works. None of these previous works considered a mean-field-
type game setup. Finally, the range of applications covered by these papers is
limited compared to the current work.
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The goal of this paper is to examine the effect of empathy on players’ be-
havior and outcomes in mean-field-type game theory. The psychology of the
players is analyzed in several engineering applications.
1.2 Contribution
Our contribution can be summarized as follows. This paper illustrates how some
insights from the psychology literature on empathy can be incorporated into a
mean-field-type payoff function, and demonstrate the potential interaction of
beliefs, strategies, mean-field through the channel of empathy. It establishes
mean-field equilibrium systems with psychological payoffs.
• Empathy as perspective taking may induce a partial altruism. To a
partially altruistic player we would be considering a payoff in the form
rλj = rj +
∑
j′ 6=j λjj′rj′ , where λjj′ ≥ 0.
It is shown that empathy-altruism promotes fairness in terms of mean-field
equilibrium payoffs in wide range of mean-field-type games. We illustrate
empathy concepts in several important engineering problems.
– We provide an experimental evidence that the degree of empathy can
shift the decisional balance in a one-shot forwarding dilemma game.
To this end, we have conducted an experimental test with 47 people
carrying mobile devices. We have developed a android app called em-
pathizer to measure dimensional empathy of the participant (Fig.1).
It turns out that empathy induces some cooperative behaviors which
consist to forward the data of the other wireless nodes in a network.
Applied to D2D communications and WiFi Direct technology, this
experiment helps us to estimate the proportion of users who are po-
tentially interesting in enabling their platform to the others. The
same method can be useful in other contexts such as mobile crowd
sensing which pertains to the monitoring of large-scale phenomena
that cannot be easily measured by a single individual user. For exam-
ple, intelligent transportation systems may require traffic congestion
monitoring and air pollution level monitoring. These phenomena can
be measured accurately only when many individuals provide speed
and air quality information from their daily commutes, which are
then aggregated spatio-temporally to determine congestion and pol-
lution levels in smart cities. It is thus important to estimate the
number of potential participants who decide their level of participa-
tion to the crowdsensing when these users are carrying power-hungry
devices to serve the cloud data.
– Empathy-altruism provides a better explanation of resource sharing
outcomes.
– The empathy-altruism of the users may help in reducing packets col-
lision in wireless medium access channel and hence reducing conges-
tion.
5
Figure 1: Empathizer app: Sample welcome screen on android platform for
measuring empathy at NYUAD L&G Lab.
– Empathy-altruism reduces energy consumption during peak hours.
– Empathy-altruism of prosumers improves their equilibrium revenues.
• Can empathy at times be harmful?
We do not restrict ourselves to the positive part of empathy. Empathy
may have a ’dark’ or at least costly side specially when the environment
is strategic and interactive as it is the case in games.
Can empathy be bad for the self? Empathy can be used, for example, by
a other player attacker to identify the weak nodes in the network.
Can empathy be bad for others? Empathetic users may use their ability to
destroy the opponents. In strategic interaction between people, empathy
may be used to derive antipathetic response (distress at seeing others’
pleasure, or pleasure at seeing others’ distress).
We illustrate this in a context of auction in prosumer (consumer-producer)
markets. A prosumer who is bidder might be losing the auction due highly
competitive prices. Yet she participates in the auction because she wants
to minimize the negative payoff on losing by making her competitor, who
would win the auction, gets low reward by selling its energy at almost zero
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price or negative price and hence the other get a high price for the win.
This negative dependence of payoff on others’ surplus is referred to as
spiteful behavior. We associate a certain spitefulness coefficient −αjj′ ≤ 0
to the bidder j. A spiteful player j maximizes the weighted difference of
her own profit rj and his competitors’ profits rj′ for all j
′ 6= j. The payoff
of a spiteful (antipathetic) player is
rαj := αjrj −
∑
j′ 6=j
αjj′rj′ (1)
Obviously, setting αjj′ = 0, j 6= j and αj = 1 yields a selfishness (whose
payoff equals his exact profit) whereas αj = 0, αjj′ = 1 defines a mali-
cious player (jammer) whose only goal is to minimize the global profit
of other players. For αj 6= 0, we can scale the payoff by
1
αj
, to get
αj
[
rj −
∑
j′ 6=j
αjj′
αj
rj′
]
, which is equivalent to focusing on
rλj = rj −
∑
j′ 6=j
λjj′rj′
where λjj′ :=
αjj′
αj
. This class of games captures a very extreme scenario
in which everyone dislikes all the others. It is shown that the empathy-
spitefulness of prosumers decreases the optimal bidding price of the win-
ners. This means that the spitefulness of the prosumers may benefit to
the consumers.
1.3 Structure
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide motivating
examples illustrating how empathy-altruism improves fairness. A generic mean-
field-type game is presented and analyzed in Section 3. Section 3.6 illustrates
empathy in variance reduction problems. Section 4 presents an experimental
setup for participation in data forwarding in D2D communications. Section 5
concludes the paper.
Notations used in the text are available in Table 1.3.
2 Empathy in game theory
2.1 Empathetic preferences
We consider the local empathetic preference, the outcome of agent i for action
ai combines her intrinsic preference for ai with the intrinsic preference of i’s
neighbors, Ni, where the weight given to the preference of any neighbor j ∈ Ni
depends on the strength of the relationship between i and j. A basic setup and
for illustration purpose this can be captured with a number λij but it could be
a general map with beliefs.
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Meaning Notation
Horizon {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}
Number of players n
Time index t
Noise ηt
State st
State mean-field mst
Action profile at
Action mean-field mat
Instant material payoff of i rit(st,m
s
t ,m
a
t , at)
Terminal material payoff of i giT (sT ,m
s
T )
Instant empathic payoff of i rλit(st,m
s
t ,m
a
t , at)
Terminal empathic payoff of i gλiT (sT ,m
s
T )
Degree of empathy of i λi ∈ Rn−1
Table 1: Notations
2.2 Empathic payoffs
2.2.1 Self-regarding payoffs
By a self-regarding player we refer to a player in a game who maximizes his own
payoff ri. A self-regarding player i thus cares about the behavior and payoffs
that impact her own payoff ri.
2.2.2 Other-regarding payoffs
An other-regarding player i considers not only her own payoff ri but also some
of her network members’ payoffs (rj)j∈Ni . Then, the player will include these in
her preferences and create an empathic payoff. She is still acting to maximize
her new empathic payoff.
2.2.3 Reciprocity payoffs
There are many interactive decision-making situations where both positive and
negative reciprocal behaviors are observed. A user carrying a wireless device
may favorably accept to forward the data of another temporary device (a new
joiner at a public place, conference or airport), and that device reciprocates the
favor although it is unlikely that they will ever meet again. In order to capture
such a phenomenon in the preferences, the kindness between players and higher
order reciprocity terms [43, 44] will be introduced below.
2.2.4 Evolution of empathy
The question of whether there is a fixed distribution of degrees of other-regarding
behaviour in the network is important. We investigate the effect of dynamic em-
pathy on the payoffs in mean-field-type games. The basic experiment reported
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below reveals that there is a distribution of empathy across the population (see
Figure 13 and Table 7) and it is context-specific.
2.3 Motivating Examples
In this section we discuss the interplay of self-regarding and other-regarding
behavior through motivating examples.
2.3.1 Empathy Explains Better the Cake Splitting Behavior
As inspired by the Ultimatum Game, we consider two sisters who are asked to
split/share a cake. The first sister, the proposer, makes an offer of how to split
the cake. The second sister, the responder, either accepts the offer, in which
case the cake is split as agreed, or rejects it, in which case neither sister receives
anything and a restart the process. If we model only with material payoff, and
the horizon is 1 then a good strategy for the proposer is to offer the smallest
possible positive share of cake and for the responder sister to accept it. However
the material payoff is not what is widely observed in engineering practice. Why?
One possible explanation may come from psychology using the empathy of the
sisters for each other. The sisters do not behave this way, however, and instead
tend to offer nearly 50% of the cake and to reject offers below 20%. Empathy
means that individuals make offers which they themselves would be prepared
to accept. If only below 20% of the cake were proposed to yourself you would
not accept so you will not propose an offer below 20%. Following that idea we
will see that empathy can lead to the evolution of fairness in the interaction.
2.3.2 Empathy-Altruism Reduces Collisions in Wireless Channels
Consider n wireless devices sharing a common medium channel using Aloha-like
protocol. If two or more users transmit simultaneously, there is a collision and
the packets are lost. If only one user transmits at a time slot with transmission
power p¯ > 0 then the transmission is successful if the received signal is good: the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is above a certain threshold βi. The success condition
is 1lSNRi≥βi which is a random variable which is equal to 1 if SNRi ≥ βi and 0
otherwise. This is an interactive decision-making framework for channel access
Player I
Transmit Wait
Player II
Transmit (0,0) (1lSNR1≥β1 , 0)
Wait (0, 1lSNR2≥β2) (0,0)
Figure 2: Random payoff matrix of wireless collision channel game with self-
regarding players. “T” is for Transmit and “W” for Wait.
point in wireless networks where the outcome is influenced not only by the
decisions of the users but also by a random variable representing the channel
state. This belongs to the class of random matrix games (RMGs, [1]) because
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the SNR appears in the entries of the payoff-matrix as the SNR depends on the
channel state which is random process.
Considering the expected material payoff, it is not difficult to observe that
(δT , yδT + (1− y)δW ) is an equilibrium for any y ∈ [0, 1]. In particular the pure
action profile (T, T ) is an equilibrium. Thus the payoff gap between the payoffs
in equilibrium is
IN(0) = max{P(SNRi ≥ βi), i ∈ {1, 2}}.
We denote by λi the degree of empathy-altruism of user i. Then, the empathic-
altruism payoff matrix is given by
Player I
T W
Player II
T (0,0) (a12, b12)
W (a21, b21) (0,0)
Figure 3: Random payoff matrix of wireless collision channel game with partial
empathy-altruism.
where
(a12, b12) = (1lSNR1≥β1 , λ21lSNR1≥β1),
(a21, b21) = (λ11lSNR2≥β2 , 1lSNR2≥β2).
With this expected empathic payoff, the profile (T,W ) is an equilibrium
and the pure action profile (T, T ) is no longer an equilibrium if max{P(SNRi ≥
βi), i ∈ {1, 2}} > 0. Thus, the equilibrium payoff gap between the users is
IN(λ) = max{(1− λj)P(SNRi ≥ βi), i, j ∈ {1, 2}}
which is smaller than IN(0) for any λ ∈ (0, 1). This says that the concept of
empathy-altruism helps to reduce collisions in wireless medium access control
(see Figure 4).
2.3.3 Empathy-altruism reduces peak hours energy consumption
Consider n consumers interacting in an energy market. The electricity price
is a function of the aggregated supply S (of the producers) , the aggregated
demand D (of the consumers) and on mismatch between supply and demand.
The payoff ri of consumer i depends on the amount of energy consumed di, on
his/her own degree of satisfactionwi(di) (a typical satisfaction function would be
wi(di) := 1− e−di) and on the electricity price p. Let ri = wi(di)−p(D,S)di be
the material payoff. The interior equilibrium (if any) when users are empathic-
selfish satisfies w′i − p
′
di
di = p and the solution is denoted by d
∗
i (0).
Let λ ∈ (0, 1) be a parameter modeling the degree of empathy-altruism of a
consumer in the power network. We denote by r˜i = ri+λrj the empathic payoff
10
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Collision channels reduction
Figure 4: Impact of empathy-altruism on collision channel reduction. As the
altruism level of the users increases the collision ratio decreases.
of prosumer i given his/her empathy-altruism toward consumers j, j 6= i. The
interior equilibrium when users are empathic-altruistic satisfies
w′i(di)− p
′
di
di = p− λdj ,
that solution is denoted by d∗i (λ). Since p − λdj ≤ p and the function di 7→
w′i(di)− p
′
di
di is non-decreasing, and a one-to-one mapping within its range, it
turns out
d∗i (λ) ≤ d
∗
i (0), ∀λ ∈ (0, 1).
Summing over the consumers, we obtain
D∗(λ) :=
∑
i
d∗i (λ) ≤ D
∗(0) =
∑
i
d∗i (0),
which means that empathy-altruism reduces the energy consumption. In partic-
ular it reduces the global peak demand during peak hours. Figure 5 represents
the total demand curve D(t) for 1 day. One can observe two important peaks
which are significantly reduced when players are empathic. The question of
how to incentivize users’ to be more empathic is an interesting direction that
we leave for future research.
2.3.4 Empathy-spitefulness of prosumers decreases the optimal bid-
ding price
Each prosumer has a unit production cost and quantity q. The production cj is
a random variable with support in [0, c¯] and with cumulative function equals to
F (.). Each prosumer knows its own production cost, its spitefulness coefficient,
its bid but not the production cost of the other bidders. Each bidder knows the
cumulative distribution of the others.
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Figure 5: Impact of empathy-altruism on peak energy demand reduction
The game is played as follows. Each prosumer bids a (unit) price pj with
the production quantity qj > 0. The expected material payoff is
rj = qj(pj − cj)1l(pj<minj′ 6=j pj′ (cj′ )) − ej ,
where ej is the entry cost to the energy market. The empathic-spiteful payoff
of prosumer j is rλj = rj − λri with λ > 0.
We are interested in structural results of equilibrium strategy under spiteful
coefficient. Let X be a random variable drawn from the interval [0, c¯] with
cumulative distribution function I. Then, the conditional expectation ofX given
that X is greater than c is given by
E(X |X > c) =
∫ c¯
c
x
I ′(x)
1− I(c)
dx.
The optimal bidding (price) strategy of the prosumer is
p∗(c, F, λ) = E(Xλ |Xλ > c),
where Xλ is a random variable with cumulative function
Iλ(c) = P (Xλ < c) = 1− (1− F (c))
1+λ.
It can easily be checked that Iλ(c) is indeed a valid cumulative distribution
function Iλ(0) = 0, Iλ(1) = 1, and Iλ is non-decreasing and differentiable. Note
that the optimal bidding price of a winner is likely to be above c so that the
prosumer gets some benefits in selling electricity to the market. The optimal
bidding price p∗(c, F, λ) decreases as the spitefulness parameter λ increases.
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2.3.5 Empathy-Altruism of Prosumers Improves the revenue of the
Prosumers
We now examine the effect of Empathy-Altruism in the revenue of the pro-
sumers. From the above analysis, the altruism strategy is obtained by changing
the sign of λ. The optimal bidding price p∗(c, F,−λ) for partially altruistic pro-
sumers increases as λ increases. This will help the prosumers to save more: the
benefit p∗ − c increases with λ ∈ (0, 1).
In the next section we present a class of mean-field-type games [7, 8, 34, 35]
and explain how the above preliminary results in Subsections (1)-(5) on the
psychology of the players can be extended to this context.
3 Psychological mean-field-type games
Definition 1 (Mean-Field-Type Game) A mean-field-type game is a game
in which the instantaneous payoffs and/or the state dynamics coefficient func-
tions involve not only the state and the action profile but also the joint distribu-
tions of state-action pairs (or its marginal distributions, i.e., the distributions
of states or the distribution of actions). A typical example of payoff function of
player j has the following structure:
rj : S ×A× P(S × A)→ R,
with rj(s, a,D(s,a)) where (s, a) is the state-action profile of the players and
D(s,a) is the distribution of the state-action pair (s, a), S is the state space and
A is the action profile space of all players.
From Definition 1, a mean-field-type game can be static or dynamic in time.
In mean-field-type games, the number of players is arbitrary: it can be finite
or infinite [22, 23, 24]. The indistinguishability property (invariance in law by
permutation of index of the players) is not assumed. A single player may have
a non-negligible impact of the mean-field. This last property makes a strong
difference between “mean-field games” and “mean-field-type games”.
One may think that “mean-field-type games” is a small and particular class
of games. However, this class includes the classical games in strategic form
because any payoff function rj(s, a) can be written as rj(s, a,D) where D(s,a)
is the distribution of the state-action pair (s, a). Thus, the form rj(s, a,D) is
more general and includes non-von Neumann payoff functions.
Example 1 (Mean-variance payoff) The payoff function of agent i is E[ri(s, a)]−
λ
√
var[ri(x, a)], λ ∈ R which can be written as a function of ri(s, a,D(s,a)). For
any number of interacting players, the term Dsi,ai) plays a non-negligible role
in the standard deviation
√
var[ri(s, a)]. Therefore, the impact of agent i in the
individual mean-field term D(si,ai) cannot be neglected.
Example 2 (Aggregative games) The payoff function of each player depends
on its own action and an aggregative term of the other actions. Example of pay-
off functions include ri(ai,
∑
j 6=i a
α
j ), α > 0 and ri(siai,
∑
j 6=i sjaj).
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In the non-atomic setting, the influence of an individual state sj and indi-
vidual action aj of any user j will have a negligible impact on mean-field term
D(s,a). In that case, one gets to the so-called mean-field game.
Example 3 (Population games) Consider a large population of agents. Each
agent has a certain state/type s ∈ S and can choose a control action a ∈ A(s).
Let m the proportion of type-action of the population. The payoff of the agent
with type/state s, control action a when the population profile m is r(s, a,m).
Global games with continuum of players is based on the Bayesian games and
uses the proportion of actions (mean-field of actions).
In the case where both non-atomic and atomic terms are involved in the
payoff, one can write the payoff function as rj(s, a,D, Dˆ) where Dˆ is the pop-
ulation state-action measure. User j may influence Dj (distribution of its own
state-action pairs) but its influence on Dˆ may be limited.
3.1 Psychological payoffs
Empathic payoff
The instant empathic payoff of i is
rλi (s,m
s,ma, a) := ri +
∑
j∈Ni\{i}
λijrj .
Selfish
λij = 0
Partially
Spiteful
λij < 0
Partially
Altruistic
λij > 0
Figure 6: Behavior of i towards j for different sign values of λij .
• Selfishness: If λij = 0 we say that i is empathic-selfish towards j. Player
i is self-regarding if λij = 0 for all j 6= i. If all the λij are zeros for every
i, j then every player focuses on her own-payoff functions.
• Partially Altruistic: If λij ∈ (0, 1) we say that i is partially empathic-
altruistic towards j. If all the λij are positive for every i, j every player is
considering the other players in its decision in a partially altruistic way.
• Partially Spiteful/Malicious: If λij < 0 we say that i is partially empathic-
spiteful towards j. If all the λij are negative for every i, j every player is
considering the other players in her decision in a partially spiteful way.
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• Mixed altruism-spitefulness-neutrality: The same player i may have dif-
ferent empathetic behaviors towards her neighbors. If λij > 0, λik < 0
and λil = 0 for j, k, l ∈ Ni\{i} then player i is partially altruistic towards
j, and partially spiteful towards k and neutral towards l.
Reciprocity payoff
Define i’s kindness to player j as
κij(ai, (bij)j 6=i) = rj(ai, (bij)j 6=i)
−
1
2
[
sup
a′
i
rj(a
′
i, (bij)j 6=i) + inf
a′
i
rj(a
′
i, (bij)j 6=i)
]
where rj(ai, (bij)j 6=i) the material payoff that player i believes that player j will
receive. We say that i is kind to j if κij > 0. i is unkind to j if κij < 0. bij is
i’s belief on player j’s strategy. In order to define reciprocity, we introduce a
second order reasoning. Let b˜ijk is k’s belief about others.
The reciprocal perceived kindness of j towards i is
κ˜iji = ri(bij , (b˜ijk)k 6=j)
−
1
2
[
sup
b′
ij
ri(b
′
ij , (b˜ijk)k 6=j) + inf
b′
ij
ri(b
′
ij , (b˜ijk)k 6=j)
]
which is what i believes that j believes that i will receive. If κ˜iji > 0 it means
that i perceives that j is kind to him.
The empathetic reciprocity payoff is rλi (a, b, b˜) = ri +
∑
j∈Ni\{i}
λijκij κ˜iji,
where λij is i’s reciprocity sensitivity towards j. If λij > 0 then κij .κ˜iji > 0
(same sign) reflects mutual kindness or mutual unkindness.
An equilibrium requires a best response property and a consistency between
these beliefs mak = bjk = b˜ijk.
3.2 Basic Dynamic Game Model
Consider a dynamic mean-field-type game setup with the following data:


Time step: t ≤ T
Set of Players: {1, . . . , n}
Initial state : s0 ∼ m0
State dynamics: st+1 ∼ qt+1(.| st,m
s
t ,m
a
t , at)
Instant material payoff of i : rit(st,m
s
t ,m
a
t , at)
Terminal material payoff of i : giT (sT ,m
s
T )
Instant psychological payoff of i : rλit(st,m
s
t ,m
a
t , at)
Terminal psychological payoff of i : gλiT (sT ,m
s
T )
Degree of empathy/reciprocity of i : λi = (λij)j
where T is the duration of the interaction, at = (a1t, . . . , ant) =: (ait, a−i,t)
represents a control-action profile of all players at time t. ai,t ∈ Ai, the space
15
of actions of i at time t, mst is the distribution of state at time t, m
a
t is the
distribution of actions at time t.
Definition 2 (Behavioral pure strategy) A behavioral pure strategy of player
i at time t is a mapping from the available information to the set of actions.
The set of pure strategies of i is denoted by Ai.
Player i’s cumulative empathic payoff is
Rλi (m
s
0, a) = E
T−1∑
t=0
rλit(st,m
s
t ,m
a
t , at) + g
λ
iT (sT ,m
s
T ).
Next we define the response of a player to the others and the mean-field.
Definition 3 (Best response) A strategy ai of player i is a best-response to
(a−i,m
a−i) if
Rλi (a) = sup
a′
i
Rλi (a
′
i, a−i).
The set of best response strategies of player i defines a best response correspon-
dence BRλi .
The existence of a pure best-response strategy can be obtained in number
of classes of games. When a pure best response strategy fails to exist, one can
use behavioral mixed strategies. Using weak compactness of the set of probabil-
ities on Ai, the existence of mixed behavioral best response can be established
following standard assumptions. Next, we define a mean-field equilibrium.
Definition 4 (Mean-field equilibrium) A strategy profile a generates a mean-
field equilibrium if for every player i, the strategy ai of i is best-response to the
others’ strategies
ai ∈ BR
λ
i (a−i),
and it generates a consistent distribution.
The existence of mean-field equilibria is not a trivial task. Sufficiency con-
ditions for existence of equilibria can be obtained using fixed-point theory. To
do so, we provide an optimality system for empathic mean-field-type games.
3.3 Dynamic Programming on the space of measures
Let the expected empathic payoff in terms of the measure mt.
Erλit(st,m
s
t ,m
a
t , at) =
∫
rλit(s¯,m
s
t ,m
a
t , at)m
s
t (ds¯)
= rˆλit(mt, at)
where rˆλit depends only on the measure mt and the strategy profile at. Similarly
one can rewrite the expected value of the terminal payoff as
EgλiT (sT ,m
s
T ) =
∫
gλiT (s¯,m
s
T )m
s
T (ds¯) = gˆ
λ
iT (m
s
T ).
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Proposition 1 On the space of measures, one has a deterministic dynamic
game problem over multiple stages. Therefore a dynamic programming principle
(DPP) holds: 

vˆλit(m
s
t ) = supa′
i
{
rˆλit(mt, a
′
it, a−i,t)
+vˆλi,t+1(m
s
t+1)
}
mst+1(ds
′) =
∫
s
qt+1(ds
′| s,mst ,m
a
t , at)m
s
t (ds)
This optimality system extends the works in [13, 14, 16, 15, 17] to the mean-
field-type game case. Note, however that one cannot directly use DPP with the
state (s, Ems, Ema) because of non-Markovian structure. It turns out that one
can map the state dynamics to the measure dynamics, and the measure should
be the state of the DPP.
Proposition 2 Suppose a sequence of real-valued function vˆλit, t ≤ T defined
on the set of probability measures over S is satisfying the DPP relation above.
Then vˆλit is the value function on P (S) starting from mt = m. Moreover if the
supremum is attained for some a∗i (.,m), then the best response strategy is in
(state-and-mean-field) feedback form. The equilibrium payoff is
Rλi (a
∗) = vˆλi0(m0).
Proposition 2 provides a sufficiency condition for best-response strategies
in terms of (s,mst ). The proof is immediate and follows from the verification
theorem of DPP in deterministic dynamic games.
3.4 Special cases
3.4.1 Finite state space
Suppose that the state space S and the action spaces are nonempty and finite.
Let the state transition be
P (st+1 = s
′ | st,m
s
t ,m
a
t , at) = qt+1(s
′| st,m
s
t ,m
a
t , at),
DPP becomes 

vˆλit(m
s
t ) = supa′i
{
rˆλit(m
s
t , a
′
it, a−i,t)
+vˆλi,t+1(m
s
t+1)
}
mst+1(s
′) =
∑
s∈S qt+1(s
′| s,mst ,m
a
t , at)m
s
t (s)
Proposition 3 A pure mean-field equilibrium may not exist in general. By ex-
tending the action space to the set of probability measures on A and the functions
rˆλit, gˆ
λ
iT , qt+1 one gets the existence of mean-field equilibria in behavioral (mixed)
strategies.
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3.4.2 Continuous state space
Consider the state dynamics
st+1 = st + bt+1(st,m
s
t ,m
a
t , at, ηt+1)
where η is a random process. The transition kernel of st+1 given st,m
s
t ,m
a
t , at
is
qt+1(ds
′| st,m
s
t ,m
a
t , at) =∫
η
P (ds′ ∋ st + bt+1(st,m
s
t ,m
a
t , at, η))Lηt+1 (dη)
where Lηt+1(dη) denotes the probability distribution of ηt+1.
3.4.3 Mean-Field Free case
If ri(s, a,m
s,ma) = ri(s, a) and gi(s,m
s) = gi(s) for every player i then
rˆλi (mt, at) =
∫
s
rλi (s, at)mt(ds).
There exists a function vλi such that
vˆλi (mt) = 〈v
λ
i ,mt〉 =
∫
s
vλi (s)mt(ds),
vλi (s) is a mean-field free function. In this case, the mean-field-type dynamic
programming reduces to
vλit(s) = sup
a′
it
Hλi (s, a
′
it, a−i,t),
where the Hamiltonian is
Hλi = r
λ
it(s, a
′
it, a−i,t) +
∫
s′
vλi,t+1(s
′)qt+1(ds
′|st, a
′
it, a−i,t)
We retrieve the classical Bellman operator in the mean-field-free case.
3.5 Empathy-Altruism reduces payoff inequality gap
The following result holds:
Proposition 4 Empathy-altruism reduces equilibrium payoff inequality gap and
improves fairness. As λ increases towards 1 the equilibrium payoff gap between
players i and j, vˆλi0 − vˆ
λ
j0 decreases.
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3.6 Variance Reduction Problem over a Network
Consider a common state dynamics between players represented by a stochastic
difference equation. The material cost functional of player i is
Li(a) = qiT s
2
T + q¯iT (E[sT ])
2
+
∑T−1
t=0 qits
2
t + q¯it(E[st])
2 + cita
2
it.
(2)
which is composed of a terminal material cost qiT s
2
T+ q¯iT (E[sT ])
2 and a running
material cost of qits
2
t + q¯it(E[st])
2+ cita
2
it. The coefficients qi, q¯i, cit are assumed
to be positive real numbers.
The players interact through the common state s which influences the ma-
terial cost function. This is a dynamic mean-field-type game where the players
are not necessarily indistinguishable because the coefficients qi, q¯i, ci, bi, may be
different from one player to another. Moreover, each player i influences the
mean-field term E[s] through its control ai. In this model, the contribution of a
single player (say i) in the mean-field term E[s] cannot be neglected. Let Ni be
the set of players that are neighbors of player i. Player i is empathic-altruistic
towards her neighbors. The empathic cost functional of i is
Lλi (a) = Li(a) +
∑
j∈Ni\{i}
λijLj(a).
We have omitted the term that is not controlled by i :∑
j∈Ni\{i}
λijcjta
2
jt


infai∈Ai E[L
λ
i (a1, . . . , an)] subject to
st+1 =
{
αst + α¯Est +
∑n
j=1 bjajt
}
+ σWt,
s0 ∼ L(S0), E[S0] = m0
(3)
given the strategy (aj)j 6=i of the others’ players.
Let t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} be the time step, qλjt =
∑
i∈Nj
[qjt+λjiqit] ≥ 0, (qλjt+
q¯λjt) ≥ 0, cjt > 0, and given linear state-and-mean-field feedback of the other
players, the problem (3) has a unique best-response of player i and it is given
by
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

aλit = ηit(st − Est) + η¯itEst,
ηit = −
[αbiβi,t+1+biβi,t+1
∑
j 6=i bjηjt]
cit+b2iβi,t+1
,
η¯it = −
biγi,t+1(α+α¯+
∑
j 6=i bj η¯j,t)
cit+b2i γi,t+1
,
βit = q
λ
it + βi,t+1{α
2 + 2α
∑
j 6=i bjηjt + [
∑
j 6=i bjηjt]
2}
−
[αbiβi,t+1+biβi,t+1
∑
j 6=i bjηjt]
2
cit+b2iβi,t+1
βiT = q
λ
iT ≥ 0
γit = (q
λ
it + q¯
λ
it) + γi,t+1(α+ α¯+
∑
j 6=i bj η¯jt)
2
−
(biγi,t+1(α+α¯+
∑
j 6=i bj η¯jt))
2
cit+b2iγi,t+1
γiT = q
λ
iT + q¯
λ
iT ≥ 0
(4)
and the best response cost of player i is
E[Lλi (a)] = Eβi0(s0 − Es0)
2 + γi0(Es0)
2 +
T−1∑
t=0
βi,t+1σ
2.
We examine the effect of λ on the mean state Est. Let the real numbers
α, α¯, bi and (Es0) be nonnegative.
Esλt+1 = (Es0)
t∏
k=0
[α+ α¯+
n∑
i=1
biη¯ik].
It follows that γλ ≥ 0 increases with λ and the coefficient η¯ik decreases with
λ. We conclude that the empathy-altruism parameter helps to lower the mean
state while helping the others in their variance reduction problem.
4 Experimental Setup
This section presents an experimental evidence of psychological factors in users’
behaviors for data forwarding in Device-to-Device (D2D) communications.
4.1 Reciprocity in Packet Forwarding in D2D Communi-
cations
The explosion of wireless applications creates an ever-increasing demand for
more radio spectrum. The presence of Device-to-Device -enabled mobile users
defines an extended network coverage and its co-existence with device-to-infrastructure
networks is not without challenges. In this context, each device can move inde-
pendently, and will therefore change its links to other devices frequently due to
connectivity issues. Relay-enabled wireless device may be requested to forward
traffic unrelated to its own use, and therefore be a temporary router or a relay.
If the receiving device can also play the role of relay then it will forward the data
to the next hop after sensing the channel again. For given routing path, the data
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need to be forwarded at each intermediary hop until the end destination. The
intermediary nodes are relays or regular nodes that are willing to forward. If
many nodes are participating in the forwarding process, every node can benefit
from that service, and hence it is a public good, which we refer to as mobile
crowdforwarding. By analogy with crowdfunding, crowdsourcing, crowdsensing,
the concept of mobile crowdforwarding consists to call for contributors (mobile
devices) who are willing to forward data in mobile ad hoc networks by means
of incentive schemes. However, most of the current smart devices are battery-
operated mobile devices that suffer from a limited battery lifetime. Hence, a
user who is forwarding a data needs also to balance with the remaining energy
by limiting the energy consumptions. When decision-makers are optimizing
their payoffs, a dilemma arises because individual and social benefits may not
coincide. Since nobody can be excluded from the use of a public good, a user
may not have an incentive to forward the data of others. One way of solving the
dilemma is to give more incentive to the users. It can be done by slightly chang-
ing the game, for example, by adding a second stage in which a reward (fair) can
be given to the contributors (non-free-riders). Consider n transmitter-receiver
pairs in a Device-to-Device (D2D) communication, with n ≥ 3. Player i’s action
space is {nF, F}, where F means the player is participating in the forwarding
process of the other players’ data, and nF refers to not forwarding. There is a
need for a critical number m∗ ≥ 2 of participants for the connectivity of D2D
communication networks. In this context it is natural to include a cost sharing
within the temporary coalition of nodes. The nodes need the coalition of hops
(relays) in order to disseminate information (Fig. 7).
Figure 7: Forwarding the data of the other nodes. S1 needs S2 to forward its
data to D1. S2 needs S1 for forwarding its data to D2. The reciprocity between
S1 and S2 helps to improve connectivity in the D2D network.
The material payoff with sharing cost is
ri =


∏di
k=1 1l{SINRhk−1hk≥βhk} if m > m∗, ai = nF∏di
k=1 1l{SINRhk−1hk≥βhk} −
m∗
m
α if m > m∗, ai = F
0 if m < m∗, ai = nF
−m∗
m
γ if m < m∗, ai = F
where α > 0, γ > 0, m :=
∑n
j=1 1l{aj=1} and ti = h0, h0h1, . . . , hl−1hdi a
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multihop path from the transmitter of i to the end-to-end destination di. We
denote by pi :=
∏di
k=1 1l{SINRhk−1hk≥βhk}.
Nash equilibria of the game with material payoff
If players are only interested in their material payoff, it leads to the situation
where no one would participate in the forwarding of everyone else data. This is
an equilibrium because it is not beneficial to forward the data when no else is
forwarding. Moreover the deviant to pay the cost −m∗α as a single deviator.
Nash equilibria of the game with empathy
One single deviant does not induce a big degradation
If λij > 0 for i and j then the empathetic payoff of i with ai = F when the
number of cooperators exceeds m∗ + 1 is
pi −
m∗
m
α+
∑
j∈Ni1\{i}
λij(pj −
m∗
m
α) +
∑
j∈Ni0
λijpj
and the empathetic payoff for ai = nF becomes
pi +
∑
j∈Ni1
λij(pj −
m∗
m
α) +
∑
j∈Ni0\{i}
λijpj
In this case a single deviant does not induce big degradation in the payoff.
One single deviant limits the performance of the network
If λij > 0 for i and j then the empathetic payoff of i with ai = F when the
number of cooperators is m∗ is
pi −
m∗
m
α+
∑
j∈Ni1\{i}
λij(pj −
m∗
m
α) +
∑
j∈Ni0
λijpj
and the empathetic payoff for ai = nF (i.e. m = m∗ − 1 < m∗) becomes
0 +
∑
j∈Ni1
λij(pj −
m∗
m
α) +
∑
j∈Ni0\{i}
λijpj
If pi −
m∗
m
α > 0 then it is better to cooperate because that voice will bring
the number of cooperators back to m∗ and the user can take the advantage of
the public good.
Nash equilibria of the game with reciprocity
If there are enough cooperators, the kindness function yields −m∗2mα when ai =
nF and +m∗2mα when ai = F. Similarly, if the number of cooperators is below m∗
then the kindness function yields −m∗2mγ when ai = nF and +
m∗
2mγ when ai = F.
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The same methodology determines the sign of the reciprocal perceived kindness.
A configuration with m∗ cooperators does induce a positive payoff to the users
thanks to the kindness and reciprocity of the some of the others and maintain
the public good. Thus, altruism and specially reciprocity of the nodes matters
in the forwarding process. This is practically observed in the experiment below.
4.2 Experimental Setup: Empathy and Cooperation
In order to understand the effect of empathy on the behavior of people choice
behind the machine, we have conducted an experimental test at NYUAD Learn-
ing & Game Theory Laboratory. We consider a sample population of 47 people
carrying wireless devices with 19 men and 28 women, with different cultures,
and nationalities and from 18 to 40 years old. Participants include engineers,
psychologists, students, non-students and professional staff members. In order
to quantify the degree of empathy, a multidimensional index measure (Interper-
sonal Reactivity Index [33, 36]) is used for each member of the population. A
participant can move around and may be within a D2D-enabled area if there is
a device within a certain range as illustrated in Figure 8. In order to setup a
D2D communication network a crucial step is the approval from the users: their
decision to cooperate or not in forwarding the data of other devices.
Figure 8: D2D and WiFi-Direct enabled technology area
Each person carrying a mobile device was invited to fill a form on its choice
in the forwarding dilemma when facing different configurations. Due to the ran-
domness in wireless channel communications, the forwarding problem becomes
a game under uncertainty. In the forwarding game, the realized payoffs are influ-
enced by the actions of the wireless devices and a random variable representing
the channel state. Such games are called Random Matrix Forwarding Games.
Given random payoff matrices, the question arise as what is meant by playing
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the random matrix game (RMG, [1]) in an optimal way. Because now the actual
payoff of the game depends not only on the action profile picked by the wireless
devices but also on the sample point of realized state of the channel. Therefore
the devices cannot guarantee themselves a certain payoff level. The wireless
devices will have to gamble depending on the channel state. The question of
how one gambles in an optimal way needs to be defined. Different approaches
have been proposed: expectation approach, variance reduction, mean-variance
approach, multi-objective approach. The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) for transmission from node S1 to S2 is given by SINRS1S2 =
p|h12|
2
N0+IS2
,
where p > 0 is the transmission power from S1, N0 > 0 is the background noise,
hS1S2 is channel state between S1 and S2, and IS2 ≥ 0 is the interference at
the receiver in S2. The notation 1l{SINRS1S2≥β} indicates the indicator function
on the event {SINRS1S2 ≥ β}, i.e., it is equal to 1 if SINRS1S2 ≥ β and 0
otherwise. Let
m11 = 1l{SINRS1S2≥β}.1l{SINRS2D1≥β},
n11 = 1l{SINRS2S1≥β}.1l{SINRS1D2≥β},
n12 = 1l{SINRS2S1≥β}.1l{SINRS1D2≥β},
m21 = 1l{SINRS1S2≥β}.1l{SINRS2D1≥β}.
Since h = (hS1S2, hS2S1, hS1D2, hS2D1) is a random vector, the coefficients
m11, n11, n12,m21 are random. This leads to a random matrix forwarding game
between wireless devices S1 and S2 as described in Table 2.
S1\ S2 F nF
F (m11 − c1, n11 − c2) (−c1, n12)
nF (m21,−c2) (0, 0)
Table 2: Random matrix forwarding game.
We describe below the expectation approach. It consists to replace the
coefficients of payoff matrix by the corresponding mathematical expectation
where the expectation is taken with the respect to h.We denote by aij := E [mij ]
and bij := E [nij ] . Then expected payoff matrix is given by Table 3.
S1\ S2 F nF
F (a11 − c1, b11 − c2) (−c1, b12)
nF (a21,−c2) (0, 0)
Table 3: Expected matrix forwarding game.
No empathy implies no network in most interesting cases
We analyze the normal form game of Table 3. If a11 − c1 < a21 then the row
player will not forward, and hence the column player as well. This leads to
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Nash equilibrium strategy (nF, nF ). If a11 − c1 > a21 then the row player will
forward, and the column player will forward if b11−c2 > b12 leading to (nF, nF ),
else if b11 − c2 < b12 then the equilibrium is (F, nF ). Similar reasoning can be
conducted by inverting the roles. Thus, when taking into consideration the
power-limited of the mobile devices, the classical material payoff analysis leads
to the outcome (nF, nF ) i.e., non-cooperation between the mobile users, and no
forwarding implies no network.
Effect of empathy on the forwarding decision
Now we involve possible empathetic situations. Two contexts were available
in the game situation. The first context is a situation where the two persons
involved in the game are friends. The second context is when they do not know
each other (they meet for example during in their way in the public transporta-
tion, and do not have an a priori relationship. The empathy measure used for
the experiment is the so-called the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) which
comprised of four scales: empathic concern (EC), perspective taking (PT), fan-
tasy scale (FS) and personal distress (PD).
• The EC scale aims to assess the affective outcomes, the tendency to expe-
rience other-oriented feelings and the response to distress in others with
the reactive response of sympathy and compassion.
• The PT scale aims to measure the process of role taking, the tendency to
adopt the psychological points of view of others.
• The PD scale demonstrates an affective outcome, and is designed to tap
ones’ own feelings of personal unease and discomfort in reaction to the
emotions of others.
• the FS aims to measure the tendency to transpose oneself into feelings
and actions of fictitious characters.
4.2.1 Procedure of the experiment
Participants were run individually, although they were led to believe that an-
other person was also taking part. The experimenters explained to each partic-
ipant that the study involved two participants, and that they were being placed
temporarily at different places. The experimenters then escorted the partici-
pant to the NYUAD Learning & Game Theory Laboratory left her alone to
read a written instruction that allows us the measure its empathy subscales,
followed by another instruction on the packet forwarding and participation into
D2D technology. The test also distinguishes the gender of the participant, in
order to make a refined study with several types and subpopulations. After
participants read the questionnaire (see Table 10), the experimenter answered
any questions, and informed them that they and the other participant in the
session had been randomly assigned to and the experimenter returned. If care-
fully filled, the instructions reveal a significant empathy scale, the latency per
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question and the decision of the participant in the forwarding game in two dif-
ferent situations: close relationship with other participant that was fictitious
in the test or no prior relationship with the participant. All participants have
wireless devices that have the capability in enabling WiFi direct and D2D tech-
nology when the users decide to do so. They have the possibility in accepting
or rejecting (to enable or to disable) to forwarding the data of the others.
4.2.2 Participation to the experiment
In the men population only two questions have been left in IRI, with a 99.63%
of responsiveness to the four different scales. In women population we had three
questions that have been left in IRI, with a 99.62% of responsiveness to the same
four different scales.
4.2.3 Analysis of the experimental data
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• Women population:
Player I
F nF
Player II
F 19 16
nF 4 16
A more refined version of the cooperators among the women population
with FnF/nFF outcomes (15/28) is obtained:
Player I
F nF
Player II
F 10 1
nF 5 13
• Men population:
Player I
F nF
Player II
F 11 8
nF 3 13
A more refined version of the cooperators among men population with FnF/nFF
outcomes shows (6/19) proportion of cooperators.
4.3 Observations from the experiment
• Although they read identical notes, we expected that participants who had
close relationship would experience more empathy for the other participant
than would participants who do not each other and never met before
(either virtually or physically). We checked this expectation with the self-
reports of IRI response that participants made after reading an alternative
question on what would be their decision if they do not know the other
participant. It turns out that only 1 person (out of 47 people) will change
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their opinion if the other user is unknown to them. Thus, both empathy
and closiness affect the decision-making of the users.
• Our second observation is that the experiment exhibits a strong correlation
between the scale of IRI and the choice of people. Figure 9 illustrates a
relationship with PT scale and percentage of cooperators.
Figure 9: Impact of positive empathy (PT) in the decision-making of the people
Using total probability theorem we obtain
P (F ) = P (F |1)P (1) + P (F |0)P (0),
where P (F |i) is the conditional probability of forwarding the data of the
others (cooperation) assuming i. We use the sample statistics to compute
the probability to cooperate through the number of occurrences of F.
• Deviation to the material payoff outcomes: What if participants in a one-
shot prisoner’s dilemma game know before making their decision that the
other person has already decided not to forward (defected)? From the per-
spective of classic game theory with material payoff, a dilemma no longer
exists because of dominating strategy. It is clearly in their best interest
to defect too. The empathy-based test predicts, however, that if some of
them feel empathy for the other, then a forwarding dilemma remains: self-
interest counsels not to forward (defection); empathy-induced behavior
may counsel not. Based on the experiment we have look at the outcomes
(F, nF ) and (nF, nF ) from the choices of 47 participants. Among those
not induced to feel empathy, very few (3/47) did not defect in return.
Among those induced to feel empathy for the other, (26/47) did not de-
fect. These experimental results highlight the power of empathy-induced
behavior to affect decisions in one-shot forwarding dilemma game.
• This experimental test reveals that empathy seems far more effective than
most other techniques that have been proposed to increase cooperation in
one-shot games.
Based on these experimental results, we believe that the idea of using (pos-
itive) empathy to increase cooperation in a one-shot forwarding dilemma and
more generally in a public good games should be explored in more details.
Can we use psychological payoff functions to explain the behaviors observed
in the experiment?
To answer this question we introduce a psychological payoff that is not only
self-interested but also other-regarding through the two random variables λ1
and λ2.
S1\ S2 F nF
F (mλ11, n
λ
11) (m
λ
12, n
λ
12)
nF (mλ21, n
λ
21) (0, 0)
Table 4: Random matrix forwarding game
mλ11 = m11 − c1 + λ1(n11 − c2), n
λ
11 = λ2(m11 − c1) + n11 − c2
mλ12 = −c1 + λ1n12, n
λ
12 = −λ2c1 + n12
mλ21 = m21 − λ1c2, n
λ
21 = λ2m21 − c2
• Case 0: In absence of empathy: λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0 corresponds to the self-
regarding payoffs case. The game leads to the outcome (nF,nF) when
m11 − c1 < m21 and n11 − c2 < n12.
• Case 1: λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0
– FF: If mλ11 ≥ m
λ
21 or n
λ
11 ≥ n
λ
12 then the strategy nF is not dominat-
ing anymore and in this case, forwarding is a good candidate for Nash
equilibrium of the psychological one-shot forwarding game. In addi-
tion, if mii ≥ 0 and λ1 ≥
c1+m21−m11
n11
and λ2 >
c2+n12−n11
m11
then full
cooperation (F, F ) becomes a Nash equilibrium. If c1+m21−m11
n11
and
c2+n12−n11
m11
belongs to (0, 1) and then a mixed strategy equilibrium
emerges in addition to the pure ones, which explains the observed
variation of percentages of cooperators depending on the empathy
index measured from the experiment.
– FnF is an equilibrium if mλ12 ≥ 0 and n
λ
12 ≥ n
λ
11. This means that
λ1n12 ≥ c1, λ2m11+n11−n12−c2 ≤ 0, i.e., λ1 positively high enough
and λ2 is low.
– Similarly when λ1 is low and λ2 positively high enough then nFF
becomes an equilibrium.
– nFnF is an equilibrium when {mλ12 ≤ 0, n
λ
21 ≤ 0} which means
λ1n12 ≤ c1, λ2m21 ≤ c2.
– If λ1 ∈ (
c1+m21−m11
n11
, c1
n12
) and λ2 ∈ (
c2+n12−n11
m11
, c2
m21
) then there are
three equilibria: FF, nFnF and a mixed equilibrium.
– If λ1 >
c1
n12
and λ2 >
c2
m21
then FF is the unique equilibrium because
F is a dominating strategy for both users.
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– If both users have low empathy λ1 <
c1+m21−m11
n11
and λ2 <
c2+n12−n11
m11
then nF is a dominating strategy for both users, hence nFnF is an
equilibrium.
• Case 2: λ1 < 0, λ2 < 0 : Both users have a dominating strategy which is
nF. Then, nFnF is the outcome.
• Case 3: λ1 > 0, λ2 < 0 : Player 2 has a dominating strategy which is nF.
Thus, FnF is the outcome if the empathy of player 1 is high enough and
nFnF otherwise. At the threshold value of λ such that mλ12 = 0, every
partially mixed strategy profile (yδF + (1 − y)δnF , nF ) with y ∈ [0, 1] is
an equilibrium.
• Case 4: λ1 < 0, λ2 > 0 : nFF is the outcome if the empathy of 2 is high
enough and nFnF otherwise.
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Figure 10: Outcome based on empathy distribution
When the parameters lead to an equality of payoff, there may be infinite
number of (mixed) equilibria. We have omitted these degenerate cases since λ
will be a continuous random variable (Figure 10 and table 5). Table 5 summa-
rizes the outcomes when the entriesm,n are non-zero depending on the affective
empathy level of the users: negative (spiteful), low (positive), medium, and high
when c1+m21−m11
n11
< c1
n12
and c2+n21−n11
m11
< c2
m21
.
This experimental test reveals a distribution of empathy across the pop-
ulation of men and women (see Figure 13). Thus, a natural question is the
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User 1 \ User 2 λ2 Negative Low Medium High
λ1 High FnF FnF F F FF
λ1 Medium nFnF nFnF FF,nFnF, p F+(1-p)nF FF
λ1 Low nFnF nFnF nFnF nFF
λ1 Negative nFnF nFnF nFnF nFF
Table 5: Summary of the outcomes. For user 1, Low empathy means λ1 ∈
(0, c1+m21−m11
n11
), Medium empathy means λ1 ∈ (
c1+m21−m11
n11
, c1
n12
) and High em-
pathy means λ1 >
c1
n12
. For user 2, low empathy means λ1 ∈ (0,
c2+n21−n11
m11
).
Medium empathy means λ2 ∈ (
c2+n21−n11
m11
, c2
m21
) and High empathy means
means λ2 >
c2
m21
.
probability to endup with FF as an outcome when people are drawn from the
empathy population sampling distribution over [−1, 1]2.
Below we examine the extreme cases with two types: High PT and Se dis-
tributed according to (1 − µ, µ) for some µ ∈ (0, 1). The resulting interaction
depends on the type of the users carrying the wireless nodes. We denote by
PT a high level of positive empathy and by Se a user with a very low level of
empathy.
PT\ PT F
F (m111 − c1,m
2
11 − c2)
∗
PT\ Se F nF
F (m111 − c1,m
2
11 − c2) (−c1,m
2
12)
Se\ PT F
F (m111 − c1,m
2
11 − c2)
F¯ (m121,−c2)
Se\ Se F nF
F (m111 − c1,m
2
11 − c2) (−c1,m
2
12)
nF (m121,−c2) (0, 0)
Table 6: Random matrix game in strategic form with incomplete information.
• In a PT-PT interaction, the equilibrium structure is to forward whenever
the channel is good enough.
• In a Se-PT or PT-Se interaction, the selfish wireless node has to compare.
In a Se-PT interaction, if m111 − c1 > m
1
21 then the selfish node 1 will
choose F otherwise will not forward (nF ). The equilibrium structure of
Se-PT interaction is
– (F, F ) if m111 − c1 > m
1
21,
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– (nF , F ) if m111 − c1 < m
1
21,
– (any mixed strategy, F ) if m111 − c1 = m
1
21
Similarly, the equilibrium structure of PT-Se interaction is
– (F, F ) if m211 − c2 > m
2
12,
– (F, nF ) if m211 − c2 < m
2
12,
– (F, any mixed strategy) if m211 − c2 = m
2
12,
• In a Se-Se interaction, the equilibrium structure is described in a similarly
way as in S1-S2 in Table 3.
Note that when we put the pure strategies together in a population context
where (1 − µ) fraction of the people are empathic PT and µ ∈ (0, 1) fraction
are selfish nodes, the resulting outcome is well-mixed of (F, F ), (F, nF ), (nF, F )
and (nF, nF ), which strengthen the observations of the experiment. It also
provides the possibility to observe the Bayesian Hannan set [3] or Bayesian
coarse correlated equilibria in experimental one-shot games.
4.4 Other empathy subscales
Screen shots of the Empatizer app are given in Figures 11 and 12. As expected,
the classification is incomplete and the subscales are not statistically indepen-
dent. They are correlated and possibly overlapping. This is represented in
Figure 13, Table 7.
Scale Type Women Men Total
PT 5 3 8
EC 2 - 2
FS 3 3 6
PD 2 4 6
PT - PD 1 1 2
FS - PD 2 - 2
EC - PD - 3 3
EC - FS - 1 1
PT - EC - PD - 1 1
EC - FS - PD 1 - 1
PT - EC - FS - PD - 1 1
Other scale 12 2 14
1 1 2
Participants 28 19 47
Table 7: IRI scale distribution across the population
In Table 10 we have completed the subscales PD, FS, EC. We observe that
both positive and negative correlation between cooperation and empathy sub-
scale can be obtained from the experiment, in particular for PD. This also reveals
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Figure 11: Empathizer measures the multidimensional empathy of each partic-
ipant.
a kind of spitefulness behavior. However, it is a mixture of several things. for
example, if player i is spiteful towards j and j is PT, the resulting outcome is
unclear.
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Figure 12: Empathizer sample result.
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Figure 13: Empathy scale distribution across the population of participants
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4.5 Evidence of Spitefulness behavior
In Table 8 we compute the correlation between the subscale of empathy from
the data collected from the participants.
Pearson correlation PT EC FS PD
PT - 0,81 0,9382 0,2796
EC - - 0,8709 -0,3462
FS - - - -
PD - - - -
Table 8: subscale correlation
Cooperation level
PT + EC 50%
PT + FS 62,5%
PT + PD 66,66 %
EC + FS 75%
EC + PD 50%
Table 9: Level of cooperation mixed scales
The more refined result on the level of cooperation corresponding to the
mixed IRI scale is given in Table 9. We can observe that a high level of coop-
eration associated to a high correlation coefficient correspond to the Empathy-
Altruism behavior (namely PT + FS and EC + FS ). A high level of coopera-
tion associated to a negative or low correlation coefficient correspond to a sort
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of empathy-spitefulness behavior (namely PT + PD, EC + PD). In particular,
the usage of empathy could be different across of the population and it is always
in a positive sense.
The experiment reveals also that “other” scale of empathy may be useful:
(i) involvement of the users in technology is different across of the population
[42], and (ii) empathy anger may be correlated with the fact that some people
are helping and some others have punishing desires [41]. We leave these refined
empathy concepts for future investigation.
5 Conclusion
Mean-field-type game theory is an emerging interdisciplinary toolbox with which
one can describe situations where multiple persons make decisions and influence
each other with state, type, actions and distributions of these. Psychological
mean-field-type game theory is as an extension of those methods, with which one
can design, analyze, identify how various psychological aspects, which classical
models typically do not take into account, affect behaviour of the decision-
makers. One can, for example, study the importance of empathy and emotions,
for example reciprocity, disappointment, regret, anger, shame, and guilt, that
is the propensity to return favors, take revenge or being malicious or spiteful.
Prior works on mean-field-type games have assumed that people’s behavior is
motivated solely by their own material payoff. Other aspects of motivation, for
example the empathy and emotions, have been disregarded. But this is a major
drawback as empathy and emotions often influence behaviour and outcomes.
In this paper, we have proposed and examined the role of empathy in mean-
field-type games. We established optimality system for such games when em-
pathic player are involved. It is shown that empathic-altruism helps in reducing
collision channel, securing the mean state and reducing electricity peak hours.
Empathy-spitefulness of prosumers lowers electricity price and hence it helps
consumers. Empathy-altruism reduces inequality between the payoffs in mean-
field-type games. The experiment with 47 people carrying mobile devices has
demonstrated that using WiFi direct, D2D or other relaying technology on cell
phones, tablets and laptops while moving or being in downtown or at airport
degrades performance if the number of cooperators is not sufficient enough, in-
creasing the response time of the servers, particularly among the users who are
far to the access points, and can lead to interruption and call blocking. There
is a need of coalition among a certain of number of nodes to maintain a mini-
mum connectivity level. The users’ who are aware of such a situation may be
empathetic. However, empathy can be used in different directions and different
strategic ways: self-regarding, other-regarding, mutual-regarding, spitefulness,
and indirect network effect etc. The experiment reveals that more cooperation
can be observed even in one-shot games when users’ are empathetic, and this
holds in both women population and men population.
Number of questions remain unanswered: (i) it would be interesting to ex-
amine the formation and the evolution of empathy as time goes, for example by
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means of learning process. (ii) time delayed empathy and forgiveness. We have
presented some of the extremes situations to illustrate clearly the influence of
psychological factors. However, the interaction in engineering games is not lim-
ited to empathy-altruism and empathy-spitefulness. There are multiple factors
and multiple possibles cross-factors: one simple behavior to examine is the effect
in the network when a user i is helping user j but not user k and j is helping
k but not l etc. It is unclear who is helping whom in the multi-hop network
through to the indirect path. We leave these issues for future investigation.
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Proof of Proposition 1:
The evolution of the distribution of states ms under state-and-mean-field feed-
back strategies is given by
mst+1(ds
′) =
∫
s
qt+1(ds
′| s,mst ,m
a
t , at)m
s
t (ds)
This is a deterministic dynamics over {0, 1, . . . , T }. Since the expected payoff
can be rewritten as a function of ms and the action, one can use a classical DPP
with m as a state.
Applying the classical dynamic programming principle (DPP) yields

vˆλit(m
s
t ) = supa′i
{
rˆλit(m
s
t , a
′
it, a−i,t)
+vˆλi,t+1(m
s
t+1)
}
mst+1(ds
′) =
∫
s
qt+1(ds
′| s,mst ,m
a
t , at)m
s
t (ds).
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We know from classical optimal control theory that a pure optimal strategy
may fail to exist in general. However, one can extend the action space to the
set of probability measures on A and the underlying functions rˆλit, gˆ
λ
iT , qt+1 can
be extended. Then, the convexity of the action space is obtained. In addition,
if the continuity of the Hamiltonian holds then one gets the existence of best
response in behavioral (mixed) strategies. Using the multi-linearity property of
the mixed extension procedure, one can use the Kakutani fixed-point theorem
to obtain the existence of equilibria in behavioral (mixed) strategies.
Proof of Proposition 4:
We now show that if all the players are empathy-altruistic then the payoff gap
is reduced across the entire network. Let λij = λji = λ ∈ (0, 1]. Observing that
Rλi −R
λ
j = Ri −Rj +
∑
k 6=i
λikRk −
∑
k 6=j
λjkRk (5)
= Ri −Rj − λ(Ri −Rj) (6)
= (1 − λ)(Ri −Rj), (7)
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Thus, from (7) one obtains the following result: If Ri − Rj 6= 0, then the
inequality ratio is
|Rλi −R
λ
j |
|Ri −Rj |
= 1− λ < 1.
which completes the proof.
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Table 10: IRI subscales. Extension of the empathy measure of Davis 1980,
Yarnold et al.1996 and Vitaglione et al. 2003. The star sign (*) denotes an
opposite (reversed) counting/scoring.
Abridged item Women (60%) Men(40%)
PT EC FS PD PT EC FS PD
(1) Daydream and fantasize (FS)
(2) Concerned with unfortunates (EC) 0.6
(3) Can’t see others’ views∗ (PT)
(4) Not sorry for others ∗ (EC)
(5) Get involved in novels (FS) 0.8
(6) Not-at-ease in emergencies (PD) 0.7
(7) Not caught-up in movies∗ (FS)
(8) Look at all sides in a fight (PT) 0.9124 0.2444
(9) Feel protective of others (EC) 0.3
(10) Feel helpless when emotional (PD)
(11) Imagine friend’s perspective (PT) 0.8393 0.824
(12) Don’t get involved in books∗ (FS)
(13) Remain calm if other’s hurt ∗ (PD)
(14) Others’ problems none mine∗ (EC)
(15) If I’m right I won’t argue∗ (PT)
(16) Feel like movie character (FS)
(17) Tense emotions scare me (PD)
(18) Don’t feel pity for others ∗ (EC)
(19) Effective in emergencies∗ (PD)
(20) Touched by things I see (EC) -0.3452
(21) Two sides to every question (PT)
(22) Soft-hearted person (EC)
(23) Feel like leading character (FS)
(44) Lose control in emergencies (PD)
(25) Put myself in others’ shoes (PT)
(26) Image novels were about me (FS)
(27) Other’s problems destroy me (PD)
(28) Put myself in other’s place (PT) 0.42
Decision outcome Women (60% of the whole population) Men(40%)
PT EC FS PD PT EC FS PD
(FF) 10/28 7/19
(FnF )
(nFF)
(nFnF) 3/28 6/19
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